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MAJORITY TYRANNY 
David A. Bateman 
LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESS: PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (UNIVERSITY PRESS 
OF KANSAS 2016). PP. 190. HARDCOVER $29.95.  
 
ANNA HARVEY, A MERE MACHINE: THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2013). PP. 384. 
HARDCOVER $55.00. PAPERBACK $37.00.  
“If a majority be united by a common interest,” wrote James Madison, “the rights of 
the minority will be insecure.”1 This possibility animated liberal political and legal thought 
during the long nineteenth century, and the specter of majoritarian tyranny that it raised 
led countless theorists to devise institutional breakers against the cresting waves of 
democracy. 
Madison himself recognized two solutions. The first worked through the 
representative system, and he famously proposed extending the republic so that the 
diversity of interests would make it improbable for a permanent majority to form.2 The 
second was to create “a will in the community independent of the majority” that could 
nullify acts of the representative branch. Madison equated this with monarchy and warned 
that it offered only a “precarious security; because a power independent of the society may 
as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, 
and may possibly be turned against both parties.”3 Many of the Constitution-writers of the 
early Republic shared Madison’s worry about the dangers of a “power independent of 
society.”4 But, colonial reformers had long asserted the principle that an independent 
judiciary should stand as a check against the Crown, and for those worried about legislative 
tyranny, the judiciary appeared as a natural substitute for a discredited monarch.  
The role of an independent authority capable of checking the elected branches was 
transferred from the Crown to the court, and by the mid-nineteenth century the 
                                                          
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 2. Others championed proportional representation so that the diversity in the electorate would be represented 
in the legislature; “fancy franchises,” to give minority classes greater legislative influence; or apportionment 
plans that would base representation on interests, occupations, or designated communities. 
 3. Id. 
 4. ANNA HARVEY, A MERE MACHINE: THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
40–54 (2013); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 161 (2d ed. 1998). 
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independence of the judiciary had come to be seen as a central principle of any just 
democratic order. “The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over 
themselves,” wrote John Stuart Mill, “might seem axiomatic when popular government 
was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the 
past.”5 But the United States had shown how majorities could be oppressive, and thus 
made clear that “precautions are as much needed against these, as against any other abuse 
of power.”6 This argument, he noted, appealed as much to theorists as to the “important 
classes in European society,” and so the “tyranny of the majority” came to generally be 
“included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.”7 
The argument that rights are best protected by an independent judiciary is at least as 
pervasive today. Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that to leave the rights of minorities to 
“the whims of the political majority” would have severe consequences for all those 
marginalized classes “who have nowhere to turn but the courts—litigants who are, by 
definition, unable to harness the ‘popular’ authority for their own constitutional interests.”8 
Judicial independence, write Bruce Fein and Burt Neuborne, is a fundamental “safeguard 
against majoritarian tyranny.”9 The protection of individual rights, Ronald Dworkin 
argues, requires that “the majority should not always be the final judge of when its own 
power should be limited.”10 An independent and empowered judiciary has been endorsed 
by the United Nations as a “Human Rights Priority,” while the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance argues that judicial independence “is critical to 
preserving the rule of law.”11 
Louis Fisher’s Congress: Protecting Individual Rights and Anna Harvey’s A Mere 
Machine offer two powerful dissents from this tradition, arguing from historical and 
statistical evidence that this celebration of judicial independence is misplaced and that 
individual and minority rights have been better and more reliably protected by popularly 
elected representative legislatures than by independent and insulated elites. Each takes aim 
at a particular orthodoxy: Fisher that the Court has better protected rights than Congress, 
and Harvey that the Court is independent and that this is the source of American rights 
protections. Together they provide powerful evidence that our confidence in judicial 
independence as a safeguard of rights is ill-founded, and urge us to reconsider the 
potentially vital role of representative legislatures. 
IN DEFENSE OF CONGRESS 
Louis Fisher’s Congress offers a robust defense of the legislature’s role in protecting 
                                                          
 5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (4th ed. 1869). 
 6. Id. at 13. 
 7. Id. See also 2 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 452, 
458 (3d ed. 1858); 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310 (Olivier Zunz ed., Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., Library of America 2004) (1840). 
 8. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1013, 1013–14 (2004). 
 9. Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 
JUDICATURE 53, 59 (2000); HARVEY, supra note 4, at 3. 
 10. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 16 (2d ed. 2005). 
 11. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 3; Nora Hedling, The Design of the Judicial Branch, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO CONSTITUTION BUILDING 223, 225, 235 (Markus Böckenförde et al. eds., 2011). 
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individual rights and fulfilling the country’s collective aspiration to self-government. 
These two goals, according to Fisher, define the purpose of American constitutionalism, 
but they were not intended to be functionally allocated to distinct institutions, with self-
government assigned to Congress and the president, and the judiciary responsible for 
protecting rights. Instead, each branch was to pursue these goals as part of an interlocking 
system, one in which the Framers expected and hoped Congress would be paramount. 
It has been awhile since Congress was held in such high regard. Only twelve percent 
of Americans expressed either a “great deal” or “quite a lot of confidence” in Congress in 
2017; forty-seven percent had “very little” or “no confidence.”12 At a moment when 
Congress can barely be relied upon to fulfill core functions of self-government—such as 
fund the government, not default on the debt, or fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court 
without partisan obstruction—one might be forgiven for finding a bit far-fetched the notion 
that it could be trusted with protecting individual rights. The Supreme Court, by contrast, 
still commands broad respect, second only to the military among American public 
institutions. 
The great value of Fisher’s book is its clear, consistent, and ultimately persuasive 
message that this denigration of Congress and valorization of the Court is mistaken history 
and misplaced faith. Through extensive historical examples, Fisher demonstrates that 
Congress has played a vital role in protecting individual and minority rights, and he 
provocatively argues that in doing so it has been more effective and reliable than the other 
branches. 
Appreciating Congress’s contribution requires that each branch be judged on the 
basis of its actions, and not, as almost inevitably works to Congress’ detriment, on its 
process or motivation. It is easy to see why this matters. When the Court acts, it explains 
its actions as mandated by the dictates of the Constitution. When the president acts, it has 
usually had the appearance of being quick, decisive, and deliberate; the process of political 
calculation and hemming and hawing tends to happen out of sight. When Congress acts, it 
is anything but; indeed, the more it has strayed from a slow, grinding, deliberative process, 
the more it has erred. Moreover, an electoral calculus can almost immediately be inferred 
from the pattern of support and opposition, creating the reasonable impression that the 
institution might not have acted had the political vanes pointed a different way. For Fisher, 
then, the primary issue is neither motivation nor process, but competence and the historical 
record. 
The core of the book lays out the historical record. Chapter Two examines the 
intentions of the Framers, and each subsequent chapter provides an overview of how 
Congress and the other branches have handled individual rights in a particular area or for 
a given category of persons: African Americans (Chapter Three), Women (Chapter Four), 
Children (Chapter Five), Religious Liberty (Chapter Six), and Native Americans (Chapter 
Seven). 
In each of these substantive areas, Fisher highlights Congress’s positive role and 
contrasts it with the indifference or bungling of the president and, especially, the Supreme 
Court, the book’s primary antagonist. “The capacity of Congress to protect individual and 
                                                          
 12. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (Aug. 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx. 
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minority rights has a long and distinguished history,” he writes, “both in taking the 
initiative in safeguarding rights and in passing remedial legislation to correct errors in the 
courts. Little in the record over the past two centuries offers convincing evidence that 
courts are particularly gifted or reliable in coming to the defense of individual rights.”13 
Fisher is an effective advocate for Congress, and the book concludes with 
suggestions on how to strengthen Congress’s institutional abilities. For four decades Fisher 
served as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers with the Congressional Research 
Service and as Specialist in Constitutional Law with the Law Library of Congress. He 
knows and cares about the institution, and believes in the principles of self-government 
that it is meant to embody. 
The book’s strength is its refutation of the often-uninvestigated assumption that 
democratic majorities in America have little interest in protecting the rights of minorities. 
Fisher documents how women, children, religious communities, indigenous nations, and 
African Americans have often found Congress to be a more welcoming branch, and more 
protective of their interests, than either the executive or the judiciary. It was Congress that 
tried to prohibit child labor; and it was the Supreme Court that repeatedly stood in its way. 
It was the Supreme Court that failed to protect the rights of women—“by and large,” wrote 
John D. Johnston, Jr. and Charles L. Knapp in 1971, “the performance of American judges 
in the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to 
abominable”—and Congress which more often rose to the occasion.14 The Supreme Court 
narrowed Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment protections for African Americans, while 
Congress tried to defend black rights during and after Reconstruction. 
The book’s coverage of congressional action and judicial decisions is extensive, and 
while there could be no real expectation of being exhaustive the book should certainly 
serve as a useful introduction for students interested in delving further into the particular 
areas that Fisher examines. It is accessibly written and will be a valuable addition to 
undergraduate courses on the courts and Congress. More generally, it provides a helpful 
reminder for students at all levels that no one institution can claim a permanent superiority 
in protecting individual rights, that there is no historical reason to believe that insulated 
elites have any greater claim to solicitude in this regard, and that ultimately “a dependence 
on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government.”15 By the conclusion, 
readers will be fully persuaded that Congress has acted to protect rights, and that it has 
often acted when the other branches have refused to do so or when they acted in ways that 
narrowed rights protections. 
Congress is a spirited defense of the institution in an area where it has few defenders, 
and a call for the most important branch in the American constitutional order to not cede 
its rightful terrain in defining and protecting rights. But the book’s defense of Congress is 
in comparison to the other branches, and while this is a useful exercise it does mean that 
the text often reads more as a critique of the Supreme Court. It is the belief that the Court 
is uniquely empowered or best able to protect rights and interpret the Constitution, and 
                                                          
 13. LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESS: PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, at xi–xii (2016). 
 14. Id. at 77; John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial 
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676 (1971). 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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that the appropriate posture of members of Congress is to respectfully submit to whatever 
it happens to decide, that seems to animate much of Fisher’s critique. “Why give one-third 
of the government the final say?” he asks.16 
The positive case for Congress, then, is not so much that it has amply protected 
individual and minority rights, but rather that it has usually done more than the other 
branches. Fisher makes a strong case for this claim, but it is hardly reassuring to those 
whose worry is not which institution will protect rights but whether those rights will be 
protected at all. 
Fisher concedes that “in times of perceived emergencies and fears of disloyalty at 
home, all three branches have failed to protect individual rights.”17 To this qualifier could 
be added ‘in times of peace and prosperity, for long expanses of American history, so long 
as the rights to be protected were those of African Americans.’ Fisher’s summary of 
congressional actions to protect African Americans during Reconstruction, and the various 
ways in which these actions were restricted or overturned by the courts, is important 
history that is known to specialists but less well-known to others. It is a point worth 
stressing: during the Civil War and for at least three decades after, the rights of African 
Americans had more committed partisans in the representative branches than they did on 
the Court. 
But it would be a mistake to cast Congress in too heroic a role: in 1884 Congress 
declined to reauthorize portions of the now struck down Civil Rights Act of 1875; it failed 
eight years later to pass legislation to protect the right to vote; and even before the Plessy 
v. Ferguson decision, Congress had affirmed the principle of separate-but-equal in 
education by allowing states to set up segregated institutions using federal money.18 It was 
Congress that repealed the federal election laws, refused to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s representation clause, declined to pass anti-lynching legislation, and which 
designed its internal rules with the intent of giving white southerners an effective veto. If 
the Supreme Court made life difficult for advocates of racial equality in the late nineteenth 
century, it was Congress which did next to nothing during the first several decades of the 
twentieth. 
It turns out that none of the branches were particularly willing to protect black 
Americans’ rights, except for when it was politically expedient. Congress has probably 
been better on balance, and this is an important point to recover. But ultimately the 
question of whether Congress or the Court has better protected African American rights 
can only be answered by another: which Court and which Congress? 
Fisher also suggests that when the Court does act it tends to make a mess of things, 
creating problems which ostensibly could have been avoided had the matter been left to 
Congress. I am sympathetic to the argument that the legislative branch is better suited to 
many of the tasks of rights protections, including balancing conflicting rights and devising 
more durable and effective policy protections. 
But this is of little value if the legislature is not actually acting to protect the right in 
question. Consider the case of abortion rights. The legislative branches might have devised 
                                                          
 16. FISHER, supra note 13, at 28. 
 17. Id. at 19. 
 18. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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a better framework than the Court established in Roe v. Wade, which Fisher argues was 
essentially unworkable.19 But even if more state legislatures had been poised to protect 
the right to an abortion, at least some American women would have been denied control 
over their bodies, precisely because no one believes that all states would have acted or that 
Congress would, or could, have done so in their stead. Roe v. Wade, whatever its faults, 
had the virtue of protecting a right for women without the distinctions of geography and 
class that would have occurred had it been left to the elected branches. 
This applies more generally. If a particular claim is and ought to be a right, and 
Congress is silent, surely the Court should act, even if in doing so it devises a policy 
framework that is less effective than what Congress might have produced. I expect Fisher 
would agree; indeed, it is implicit in his comparison that the Court is also under a mandate 
to protect rights. But it does make concerns over the coherence of a Court’s action a 
distinctly secondary matter. If the Court acts to protect rights where Congress has failed, 
this might represent a “decline in the power of the people the legislature represents” and 
“a loss of self-government,”20 and perhaps ought to be regretted on that ground or on 
grounds that it is less coherent and durable than congressional action.21 But if the 
legislature will not act, the Court must.  
The best hope, then, is perhaps that which was expressed by Alexis de Tocqueville: 
that the courts would “serve to correct the aberrations of democracy,” and while never 
“thwarting the impulses of the majority” they might nonetheless “slow them down and 
guide them.”22 
But as Anna Harvey makes clear, this hope too is probably misguided. 
THE DEPENDENT COURT 
If the Supreme Court in Congress is an unreliable protector of rights, in Anna 
Harvey’s A Mere Machine it is reduced to a mechanical agent of the legislature. Harvey 
takes aim at two of the most enduring beliefs about the Court: that it is an independent 
agent whose decisions reflect some combination of justices’ preferences and their 
interpretation of the Constitution; and that such independence would be a good thing if it 
were true. 
Harvey argues instead that the Supreme Court is highly responsive to the preferences 
of the political branches, and in particular to the House of Representatives. And, more 
provocatively, she argues that rights are better protected because of this judicial 
dependence than they would be with a more independent judiciary. Harvey’s argument is 
subtle but guided by a powerful logic, and with her careful empirical analysis she makes 
a compelling case and an important contribution in the study of judicial behavior. 
The basic outline of the argument and summary of the findings is provided in 
Chapter One. The courts, Harvey suggests, were not designed to be independent. They 
were instead made dependent on the goodwill of the House, which was given the authority 
to initiate impeachment proceedings and originate appropriations bills. “The Constitution 
                                                          
 19. FISHER, supra note 13, at 82 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 20. Id. at 30, 161. 
 21. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 16. 
 22. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 331. 
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leashed these judges,” Harvey writes, and “the House of Representatives holds the 
leash.”23 Most existing studies have found no evidence for such a leash, but these have 
generally been based on problematic measures. Once more “objective” measures are used, 
Harvey finds a strong positive association between the preferences of the median 
Representative and the decisions of the Court. 
Harvey then asks a broader question: “what’s so great about independent courts?”24 
She notes, quite rightly, that the logic by which independent courts should provide better 
rights protections than elected officials is not entirely clear. “After all,” she writes, 
“political leaders who are held accountable to such majorities provide significantly higher 
levels of civil rights and liberties than do their more ‘independent’ counterparts.”25 I 
expect Louis Fisher would agree. 
The remainder of the book expands upon these points. Chapter Two debunks 
common arguments in favor of judicial independence, either as the intent of the Framers 
or as an accurate description of reality.26 Chapter Three analyzes judicial decision-making 
as a function of the preferences of the median justice and median members of the House 
and Senate.27 Chapter Four introduces the puzzle of the “two Rehnquist Courts,” namely 
the surprising liberalism of the early Rehnquist Court followed by its sharp move to the 
right in the mid-1990s.28 Chapter Five introduces new measures that allow this shift to be 
identified and explained, connecting it to the Republican takeover of the House in 1994.29 
Chapter Six subjects this finding to a more systematic analysis, controlling for economic 
conditions and public opinion.30 Chapter Seven provides evidence that when the 
preferences of the Court and House diverge, the Court reduces the number of cases it hears, 
avoiding a choice between its own preferences and those of the political branch.31 Chapter 
Eight reinterprets the Roberts Court in light of the book’s findings, and Chapter Nine 
extends the argument cross-nationally.32 
Perhaps the first question that arises is why Harvey finds evidence of judicial 
deference when so many previous studies—including that in Chapter Three—find none? 
Previous studies, it turns out, have been relying on a problematic coding scheme. The 
standard measure of judicial decisions used in the literature is the U.S. Supreme Court 
Database, which codes each decision as either liberal or conservative based on a structured 
assessment protocol.33 The problem, argues Harvey, is that the subjectivity of the process 
allows the codings to be contaminated by the expectation of judicial independence: in 
short, a decision might be coded as “liberal” because it was issued by a Court known to be 
                                                          
 23. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 291. 
 24. Id. at 23. 
 25. Id. at 25. 
 26. Id. at 35. 
 27. Id. at 77. 
 28. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 107. 
 29. Id. at 141. 
 30. Id. at 191. 
 31. Id. at 223. 
 32. Id. at 249, 264. 
 33. U.S. SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
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liberal and which is assumed to decide cases based on its own preferences.34 
Harvey introduces alternative measures based on Keith Poole and Howard 
Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE, on the partisan control of the enacting Congress, and on 
the estimated medians of the enacting chambers under divided government. In the first, 
the final passage votes for statutes struck down or upheld by Congress are identified and 
the ideological direction of the statute is determined by looking at how it was arrayed on 
DW-NOMINATE economic liberalism dimension. Relatively few policies, however, 
receive a final passage vote. For this reason, Harvey constructs a second measure, which 
assigns a conservative or liberal coding to a statute based on which party was in control of 
Congress: unified Democratic control results in liberal legislation, while unified 
Republican control results in conservative legislation. This still leaves out statutes passed 
under divided government, and so Harvey assigns each a location along an ideological 
dimension by inferring that it fell at the midpoint between the House and Chamber median 
for the enacting Congress. 
We are on tricky terrain here. Consider the first measure. DW-NOMINATE scores 
are invaluable, but they are not an “objective” measure of the ideological direction of 
policy. The scores are based on the assumption that legislators vote according to a spatial 
model in which individual preferences are arrayed along an ideological dimension. But we 
know that ideology is not the only determinant of vote choice, and that party and other 
factors can lead legislators to vote for bills that they would otherwise oppose.35 As a result, 
we cannot know a priori whether any given vote is an ideological one, a partisan one, or 
something else. To determine whether any given vote is better described as liberal or 
conservative in the DW-NOMINATE framework requires close inspection and, 
ultimately, a subjective evaluation. Far from perfect, Harvey’s measures do provides a new 
and valuable perspective on the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions.  
And what is most striking is that across several different measures, and across 
numerous model specifications, Harvey persistently finds that Court decisions are 
responsive to House preferences. It is a robust finding, and given the different approaches 
used it cannot be written off as an artifact of the coding decisions. 
The next question is why the House, and not the Senate or some combination of the 
two? To be clear, it is not public opinion: Harvey shows that the Court is not responsive 
to shifts in an aggregate index of public support for conservative policy positions, nor to 
the shifting economic and social indicators—such as the crime rate or unemployment—
that we might expect help drive public mood. It is the House to which the Court responds, 
and not the people that this House ostensibly represents. 
Harvey argues that this is because the Constitution requires appropriation bills to 
originate in the House and assigns this chamber responsibility for initiating impeachment 
charges.36 While the House has not impeached a Supreme Court Justice since 1805, it has 
impeached federal judges at other levels; and besides, it is possible that the dearth of 
                                                          
 34. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 143. 
 35. As the vote on Medicare Part D made clear, sometimes conservatives vote for liberal policies, and liberals 
vote against them. Poole and Rosenthal initially labeled the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE a “party loyalty” 
dimension. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL 
CALL VOTING (1997). 
 36. The House sets the agenda in both. See HARVEY, supra note 4, at 57. 
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impeachments is because the “mere existence” of the power has induced “judicial 
deference to elected branch preferences.”37 While federal judges are constitutionally 
protected from diminishment in pay, they are not protected from a diminishment of pay in 
real terms. As a result, we are told, “Federal judges must go cap in hand to the elected 
branches every year in an effort to assemble majorities supportive of judicial salary 
increases.”38 
Indeed, federal judges—including Supreme Court justices—often do lobby for 
increased pay, and legislators have often been quite reluctant to listen.39 More generally, 
fights between judges and legislatures over salaries are a persistent feature of American 
state politics, suggesting that constitutional provisions against pay reductions do not 
induce legislative solicitude toward judges’ social and economic standing.40 
The claim that this is what induces judicial deference is ultimately speculative; it is 
compatible with the finding of House influence but not tested directly. Indeed, it is difficult 
to think of how it might be tested, at least without turning to a historical examination in 
which the threat of pay reductions or impeachment can be shown, through process tracing 
or other approaches, to have influenced judicial decisions. In any case, the possibility that 
judicial deference is induced by a constitutional leash held by the House is provocative, 
theoretically supported, and deserving of more research to supplement the careful 
empirical evidence brought to bear by Harvey. 
Harvey’s finding of judicial responsiveness to House preferences would stand as a 
major contribution on its own. But she goes further, arguing that this responsiveness to the 
House is a good thing, that the Court’s dependence has helped limit the danger it would 
otherwise pose, and that judicial dependence on democratically elected branches is 
associated with stronger rights protections around the world. 
Here too she is dissenting from an established body of research, one that finds 
evidence of a positive relationship between judicial independence and rights protection. 
This result, Harvey argues, is due to particular coding decisions and modeling choices. In 
this case, Harvey argues that measures of judicial independence do not fully account for 
the subtler forms of dependence that she has identified in the American case, and that most 
accounts fail to consider how the relative level of rights protection afforded by the 
judiciary might be conditional upon the democratic quality of a country’s political 
institutions. 
The conditional argument was nicely summed up by Thomas Jefferson:  
In England, where judges were named and removable at the will of an hereditary 
executive, from which branch most misrule was feared, and has flowed, it was a 
great point gained, by fixing them for life, to make them independent of that 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 12. 
 38. Id. at 58. 
 39. Lyle Denniston, Major Victory—and Pay Raises—for U.S. Judges, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 7, 2012, 12:48 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/major-victory-and-pay-raises-for-u-s-judges. 
 40. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy raised hackles with their insistence that judges need to be paid 
more, pointing to the growth in salaries of non-judging peer groups. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-
END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2007), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year 
-endreport.pdf; Dahlia Lithwick, Courting Cash: Kennedy Weighs in on the Crisis in Judicial Pay, SLATE (Feb. 
14, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/02/ courting_cash.html. 
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executive. But in a government founded on the public will, this principle operates 
in an opposite direction, and against that will.41  
In short, independent judiciaries should enhance rights protections when the legislature or 
executive is not subject to popular control. Where these branches are elected, however, 
they will be more solicitous of popular rights and independent courts relatively less so. 
Here too the argument is persuasive and the findings are robust to different 
specifications. This is especially true of the finding that judicial independence is positively 
associated with rights protections in less democratic countries and negatively associated 
in more democratic countries. It is best, it seems, to be in an extensively majoritarian 
regime, one in which small elite bodies are either not able to overturn legislation or cannot 
do so without being subjected to the control of the elected branches. The worst regimes 
for rights protections are, unsurprisingly, non-majoritarian and non-democratic. But in this 
case an independent judiciary is, all things considered, a net positive. The much-praised 
virtues of judicial independence are not illusory; but they are conditional on the democratic 
character of the government. 
A Mere Machine advances a compelling argument that the Court does defer to 
popular majorities, not through some mystical ability to gauge public opinion but through 
the control that the House of Representatives can bring to bear upon it. It is an excellent 
example of how careful empirical analyses, informed by theory, can lead to new and 
interesting discoveries. It will be essential reading for graduate and undergraduate students 
in public law and American institutions. 
WIGS OR DEMOCRATS? 
Both Congress and A Mere Machine share an appreciation for representative 
democracy, at least when compared with the alternative of judiciaries accountable to no 
one but themselves. 
Their arguments, however, are not entirely compatible. If Harvey is correct that the 
Supreme Court mechanically follows the House, then a good portion of the blame Fisher 
directs toward the Court should rightfully rest with Congress. Again, the case of black 
Americans’ political and civil rights is illustrative: the long indifference of the Court to 
black rights, from Plessy to Brown, comes after the defeat of congressional Republican 
efforts to protect the vote and after the federal government, through Congress, has given 
its imprimatur to racial segregation in education. If the Court follows the House, then the 
House’s preferences had been made clear by the time Plessy reached the docket. This, of 
course, shifts the weight of responsibility back to Congress. 
And it is here where responsibility ultimately lies. This strikes me as the unavoidable 
implication of both texts: if Fisher is right, Congress does rights protection better, and 
ought to be more active in this domain; if Harvey is right, the House is responsible for 
Court decisions anyway, with the slack in the Court’s leash more likely to result in a 
downward ratcheting of rights rather than their enhanced protection.42 
This is not, for me at least, a conclusion that inspires much optimism. Fisher is 
                                                          
 41. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 274 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) 
(copy on file with the Tulsa Law Review)). 
 42. Id. at 291. 
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entirely persuasive that democratic institutions often protect rights more than unelected 
institutions. Yet, it is also apparent that they often neglect, and not infrequently oppress, 
minority or politically weak groups. Indeed, in both texts one gets the sense that the rights 
that are most effectively protected by democratic majorities are those in which those 
majorities share the benefits.43 In Harvey, this takes the form of an occasional 
transformation in the object of analysis, with “rights protections” becoming the provision 
of “public goods.”44 For Fisher, the strongest evidence of congressional activism comes 
in the area of religious liberty: “religious interests often fare well in the political 
marketplace,” he writes.45 It seems likely that this is in part because, while most 
Americans are religious and Christian, no one denomination has been demographically 
dominant. So long as “Christian” did not have the political relevance of “Catholic,” 
“Presbyterian,” or “Baptist,” we tended to be in Madison’s world, where no majority group 
is united in a common interest against the minority. But the treatment by Congress and 
state legislatures of Mormons,46 Jehovah’s Witnesses,47 and Muslims,48 serves as a 
cautionary tale about the caprices of majority rule, and the limits of both the political 
marketplace and the judiciary in protecting minority rights. 
Courts, it seems, are not very reliable protectors of what John Hart Ely called 
“society’s habitual unequals.”49 But neither are representative institutions, unless there is 
a good reason for them to be so, rooted in the political configuration of a given place and 
time and in the electoral interests of its members. To paraphrase, and contradict, Ronald 
Dworkin, the United States is a more just society than it would have been had its 
constitutional rights been left to the conscience of unelected judiciaries rather than 
majoritarian institutions.50 And it would have been more just still had those majoritarian 
institutions themselves possessed more of a conscience. 
Where does this leave us? Parchment rights are no salvation, nor are independent 
judiciaries. However uncertain, bitter, and polarized, active engagement in democratic 
politics remains our best hope. 
                                                          
 43. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 20 (1985) (“[T]he Congress and the President can be counted upon to defend 
most of us from the infringement of fundamental liberties, because the political majorities to which those 
departments of government answer demand such protection.”). 
 44. In the book’s index, the entry “Public Goods” simply says, “See Rights protection.” HARVEY, supra note 
4, at 292, 361. 
 45. Of the book’s approximately 111 pages devoted to the case studies, forty-four are focused on religious 
liberty once one includes religious issues in other chapters than that on religious liberty itself. FISHER, supra note 
13, at 103–13, 115–35, 137–39, 146–56. 
 46. Id. at 126–27. 
 47. Id. at 104–11. 
 48. COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, LEGISLATING FEAR: ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS IMPACT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 59–74 (2013), available at https://www.cair.com/islamophobia/legislating-fear-2013-
report.html. 
 49. John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 453 
(1978). 
 50. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 356 (1986). 
11
Bateman: Majority Tyranny
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2017
